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Abstract
The literature reviewed suggests that Network Intrusion Systems (NIDS) are valuable tools for the
detection of malicious behaviour in network environments. NIDS provide alerts and the trigger for
rapid responses to attacks. Our previous research had shown that NIDS performance in wireless
networkshadawidevariationunderdifferentworkloads.Inthisresearchwechosewirednetworks
andaskedthequestion:WhatistheevidentialvalueofNIDS?ThreedifferentNIDSweretestedunder
two different attacks and with six different packet rates. The results were alarming. As the work
loadingincreasedtheNIDSdetectioncapabilityfellrapidlyandasthecomplexityofattackincreased
theNIDSdetectioncapabilityfellmorequickly.WeconcludethatNIDShaveweakevidentialvaluefor
eithersystemimprovementorlegaladmissibility.
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INTRODUCTION
Intrusion Detection systems are the tools that process, identify and respond to malicious activity
targeted at information and networking resources (Lokhande, Bhaskarwar, Bhaskarwar, &
Chidrawar, 2012). In general IDSs are categorized into the two types; network intrusion detection
systems (NIDS) and hostbased IDS. A NIDS monitors packets on the network and attempts to
discoverifahackeristryingtobreakintoasystem(Maier,Sommer,Dreger,Feldmann,Paxson,&
Schneider, 2008). A typical example is a system that watches a large number of TCP connection
requests (SYN) for many different ports on a target machine, thus discovering if someone is
attemptingaTCPportscan.Thistechnologyhasbeenmadetocompareusers’actionagainstknown
attack scenarios and be able to predict and indicate suspicious behaviour. There are two types of
NIDS and each one has different mechanisms from the others. These types are: Anomalybased
detectionalsoknownasbehaviourbaseddetectionthatworkstodetectthebehaviourthatisnot
normalorisnotcompatiblewithnormalbehaviour.TheoreticallythistypeofIDSsrequiresawhole
listofnormalbehaviouractions.However,insomeenvironmentsthiscanworkbecausethenormal
behaviouractionsarelimited(Ren,2006).Themodelisconsideredtobedangerousbecauseitmight
haveunacceptablebehaviourlistedwithinthetrainingdataanditwillbeacceptedlaterasnormal
behaviour.ThesecondoneisSignaturebaseddetectionalsoknownasmisusebaseddetection.This
typeusesthesignatureofknownmaliciousactivities.Italsoworksbyaddingawholelistofknown
maliciousactionsormisusesignatures(Saari&Jantan,2011).Althoughthereareahugenumberof
malicious actions, it is impossible to put all these activities on a list and keep it manageable.
Therefore,thereareonlyalimitednumberofactionsignaturesaddedtothelistandthelimitation
depends on three activities: unauthorized modification, unauthorized access and denial of service
(Pomeroy&Tan,2011).

NIDSASSOURCESOFEVIDENCE
Thereisawidearrayofintrusiondetectionsystemsthatarespecificallydesignedforwirednetworks
(Sommer, 1999; Nikkel, 2005). These systems and/or products are available in two types; either
opensourcesoftwareorcommercialonesandallofthemareaddressingarangeoforganizational
security goals and considerations. Snort is one of the most popular deployed systems in most
network security environments and it is considered to have a huge dataset of signatures for
malicious activities. It searches for very specific content in the network stream and reports each
instanceofaparticularsignature.Snort’smodulardesignallowsdeveloperstocreateandaddextra
features into the core detection engine.  However, snort may have some disadvantages such as
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dropping packets when the process network rate is at 100200 megabytes per second before
reaching the processing limit of a single CPU because the Snort engine is designed to work with
singlethreaded multistage units. Research reports have compared Snort with other IDS such as
Suricata and BroIDS that offer different features and capabilities. They concluded that Suricata’s
multithreaded architecture requires more memory and CPU resources than Snort but it can
accommodatemanynetworkinstanceswithnoneedtousemultipleinstances.Ontheotherhand,
snortisefficientbutwith limitedabilityto measuremore than200300Mbpsnetworkbandwidth
perinstance(Saari&Jantan,2011).Bothsystemswereobservedtomissseveralcommonmalicious
packets. BroIDS is slightly different in that it uses more sophisticated signatures by means of its
policy language. It can analyse network traffic at a much higherlevel of abstraction, and has
powerful facilities for storing information about past activity and incorporating it into analysis of
new activity which means it is better for forensics. IDS can be selected for context, used together
andoptimisedforpurpose.

Numerous papers have been published suggesting that NIDS can be used as sources of evidence;
however,eachreferenceacknowledgesthatthereisagapbetweenthepurposesofNIDSsandthe
needsofthelegalsystem(Casey,2004).Thisgapdoesn’tonlylackatafunctionalandapurposive
level, but also the preservation and completeness of evidence may be insufficient or incomplete.
Hence consideration of embedding NIDS in support systems and improving NIDS capability are
potential solutions. Some recent intrusion detection systems are capable of recording malicious
commands including source and distinct network addresses, protocol used, event characteristics
suchastimeanddateandfurtherrelatedinformationsuchasusernameandfilenameappliedwithin
the application. These innovations are a move in the required direction for better evidence
collection.

Thepublishedworksontheuseofusingintrusiondetectionsystemsfornetworkforensicspurposes
outline the analytic potential for attacks, duration accounting of the exploit and recording the
methods applied during the attack (Saari & Jantan, 2011; Kaur & Kaur, 2012). These descriptions
includelogsysteminformationgathering,adaptivecaptureofnetworktraffic,storingthehistorical
network misuse patterns and active or automated responses for investigational forensics. A
suggested investigatory system contains four elements which are a forensics server, network
forensicsagents,networkmonitors,andnetworkinvestigatorsoftware(Reith,Carr&Gunsch,2002).
Another simple framework for distributed forensics has an integrated platform for automatic
evidence collection and efficient data storage, and matching known attribution methods against
attacks. This model has proxy and agent architectures that collect, stores, processes and analyses
forensic information. One advantage is automatic evidence collection and quick responses to
networkattacks.Othersystemsprovideacombinationofagenttheoriesandartificialintelligenceto
dynamically assure evidence retention and extraction capabilities. The systems have different
elements to storedataintheforensicsserverand collectthe datafromforensicagents,detector
agents and responseagents. The detectoragent, forensicsagent and responseagents manage to
capture realtime network data, match them with intrusion behaviour and then send them to the
forensics–agent.Theforensicsagenthelpstocollectthedigitalevidence,createadigitalsignature
andthentransmittheevidencetotheforensicserver.Theforensicserverplaysaroleinanalysing
theevidenceandreplayingtheattackprocedureinordertocreateaquickresponsetoattacks(Pilli,
Joshi,&Niyogi,2010).

THERESEARCHQUESTIONS
TestingofNIDSinwirelessnetworksshowedthatperformanceswererelatedtoworkloadingsand
that generally inadequate evidence was stored for forensic purposes (Laurenson, 2010). These
findings and the literature reviewed suggest that there are issues and problems associated with
usingNIDSforevidentialpurposes.Consequentlythemainresearchquestionwasdefinedas:What
istheevidentialvalueofaNIDS?
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Laurenson’s (2010) research was conducted in a wireless network so we resolved the variation of
testinghisfindingsinawirednetwork.AlsohechosetotestNIDSunderincreasingworkloads.We
resolvedtodothesamebutinadditiontoconsiderthecomplexityvariableasapotentialinfluence
on performance. The motivation for researching tool complexity came from the literature on the
architecturesofdifferentNIDSandtheircapabilities.Henceweaskedsetofsubquestionstotease
outthemainquestionintheproblemcontext:

(1)Whatisthenumberofpacketslost?
(2)Whatistheretentionofeventdata?
(3)WhatcomplexitycanaNIDScopewith?
(4)Whatarethesystemcosts?
(5)Whatistheviabilityoftheevidenceforcompliancewithlegalexpectations?

Testingsubquestions(1)to(4)reliesonstresstestingandcountdata.Subquestion(5)howeverhas
legalcomplexityandrequiresthespecificationofadmissibilitycriteria.Consequentlywechosethe
Daubert criteria (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daubert_standard) to be a fair representation and
generalisationofthegroundsonwhichacourtmayacceptevidence.Thecriteriaare:

1. Empirical testing: whether the theory or technique is falsifiable, refutable, and/or
testable.
2. Whetherithasbeensubjectedtopeerreviewandpublication.
3. Theknownorpotentialerrorrate.
4. Theexistenceandmaintenanceofstandardsandcontrolsconcerningitsoperation.
5. The degree to which the theory and technique is generally accepted by a relevant
scientificcommunity.

THERESEARCHDESIGN
NIDS are principally software assets that manage adverse events and maintain the system status
quo.Inouranalysisofliteraturenoneaddressedtheevidentialissueofprosecutingoffendersand
henceliftingthesystemdefencetoalevelofhumanaccountability.Thiswouldnotbethecaseifa
retailshopwasbrokenintoanddamagesdone.Thepolicewouldbecalledandevidencecollectedto
identify the offenders. The retail shop owners would also review the security measures and make
anysuitableadjustments.TousitseemedunusualthatNIDSwithevidentialcapabilitiescouldnotbe
liftedtothestatusofprosecutionevidence.Tothisendwedesignedanumberofteststoseehow
goodNIDSwereatcollectingprosecutionevidenceandwhatelementsrequiredimprovement.Our
testbed is illustrated in Figure 1 below. The testbed had facilities to generate packets at different
controlledrates,asimulatedattackerwhocouldlaunchCrosssitescriptingattacksandSQLinjection
attacks,apacketsnifferattherouter,afirewall,alocationtoplacethedifferentNIDSfortestingand
forensicandwebserverstorespectivelycollectallpacketsandtoprovidetargetservices.
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Figure1.TheTestbedArchitecture


The research proceeded by benchmarking the system at status zero where everything was set to
zerocapability.Thesystemwasthenpoweredupandthefunctionalityofeachcomponentchecked.
Thetestingstartedbysettingthepacketratevalueandbylaunchingoneattack.Oncethedatawas
collectedthenthenextpacketratewassetandrununtilthemaximumvalueof100Mbs.Therates
startedatanarbitrary.4Mbsandthenweresteppedat20Mbsacross5intervals.Theprocedurewas
repeatedforthesecondattacktype.Oncecompletedthesystemwasreturnedtotheoriginalzero
state, a different NIDS mounted and the procedures repeated again until all the NIDS had been
tested.

THERESULTS
TheresultsofourtestingofthreeNIDSprovidedanswerstoeachofthesubquestions.Inthefirst
instance(1)thenumberofpacketsdroppedbytheNIDSincreasedwiththeworkload(seefigure2).
Snortshowedgreatestincreaseindroppedpacketsfrom30%at30Mbsto80%at100Mbs.BroIDS
andSuricatadroppedsomepacketsbutremainedunder10%forthewholeexperiment.EachNIDS
retainednodataunlesstheoptionswereconfiguredtodothis(2).Inthetestbedarchitecturethe
forensic server retained all evidence generated by the configured NIDS plus all traffic passing
through the network. BroIDS and Suricata delivered more evidence than Snort as both had more
options and dropped fewer packets.  The tests for complexity (3) showed variable performance
betweentheNIDS(seefigure3).Figure3showstheresultsofthecrosssitescriptingattack–the
mostcomplexattack.Fourattacksweremadeateachworkload.At10MbsonlyBroIDSdetectedall
attacks.At100MbsnoneoftheNIDSdetectedanyattacks.Snorthadthelowestperformanceand
Suricataperformedbetter.TheSQLinjectionattackhadlesscomplexitythanthecrosssitescripting
attacksbuttheresultsshowedasimilarpattern.EachNIDSmaintainedahigherdetectionratebut
all fell to zero by 100Mbs. The system costs (4) in terms of CPU usage and memory requirement
wereasexpected(seefigure4).AsapercentageofCPUusageBroIDSandSuricatawerebothmore
costly. These costs were expected because the NIDS with higher level abstractions also require
greater computational power and storage services. Snort is a long established product that was
designedforminimalrequirementsandasaconsequenceisineffectiveundercomplexattacksand
heavy workloads. However it is economical in terms of its cost to the system and presents a low
overhead. Subquestion (5) required higher level analysis to resolve the relationship between the
dataandtheDaubertcriteria.

The scenario is that a NIDS is being used to collect evidence of a system attack. Under the first
Daubertcriteriatheevidenceisnotrepeatablebecausethedatasetsareincompleteandeachtrial
forempiricaltestingisauniqueevent.Undercriteria2.,theuseofNIDSforcollectingevidencehave
been subject to peer review and publications but these publications (as referenced above) report
problemswiththeintegrityandconsistencyoftheevidenceindifferentconditions.Undercriteria3.,
thepotentialerrorratesarenottabulatedbutcanbeestablishedinpretests.Undercriteria4.,NIDS
areusedinnetworksystemsthatcanbecertifiedandheldincontrolbystandardsandrequirements
fortheoperationaluse.Undercriteria5.,thetheory,theuseandtheacceptanceofNIDSisgenerally
acceptedintheITsecuritycommunity.
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Figure2.Droppedpacketpercentage
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Figure3.CrossSiteScriptingAttackDetection(4intotalforeachNIDS)
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Figure4.CPUutilization(Maximum4x100%)


DISCUSSION
The results of this research are disturbing. The literature reviewed suggested that NIDS were
valuable assets for network security and forensic investigation. The literature also indicated
weaknessesinNIDSthatcanaffecteffectivenessandourresultsconfirmLaurenson’s(2010)general
performance concerns found in wireless networks. NIDS act as detection systems and trigger
responsesystemstoprotectassets.Inadditionlogfilesarekept(whenconfigured)sothatrecords
of events are retained. However, our research shows that a NIDS only performs its required
functionalityinparticularconditions.Whencomplexattackshappenduringheavyworkloadperiods
mostNIDSfailtoperform.Theimplicationsofthisimpactthetrustusersmayhaveandthedegreeof
assurancethatmaybegiventoanynetworksystemprotectedbyNIDS.

Themainresearchquestionasked:WhatistheevidentialvalueofNIDS?Therearetwopartsinthe
answertothequestion.EvidencefromNIDShasfromtheliteraturereviewedprincipallyconcerned
evidence of an attack that can be made available from the system log files. The evidence is
consequently used in a forensic post event fashion to better prepare and to prevent a similar
occurrence.However,contrarytothestrongassertionsmadeintheliteraturethepopularNIDSwe
testedandundertheconditionsfailedtoperformasrequired.Theimplicationsofourfindingsare
both for alerts and responses and for post mortem actions. The data showed that under some
conditions 100% of the attacks passed unreported.  A normal system is expected to perform at
100MbsandagainstwidelyavailableandusedattacksandyettheNIDStestedfailed.Systempost
mortemimprovementbasedonsuchincompletedatasetscanonlybeinadequatefordefence.SQL
injectionattackshavebeenusedonbusinessestoalterstockpricesandtomakelegitimatesalesat
incorrect transaction points; effectively taking $1000s from stores. Similarly Cross Site scripting
attackshavebeenusedagainstbankstofuzzonlinebankingformsandtosteal$1000s.Thecostto
businessesofmissingoneoftheseattacksishigh;andyetourstudyshowsthat100%oftheattacks
can be missed under normal network working conditions. The results raise serious concerns for
networksecurityandtheassuranceofassetprotection.
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The second part of the question concerned the availability and the quality of evidence for
prosecutingoffenders.Asmentionedabovethisistheusualexpectationwheredamagesorthefthas
occurred to a business or the systems. We used the Daubert criteria to assess the potential
admissibilityoftheevidencetocourt.Assessmentofthefirstcriteriasuggestedthatrepeatability
andthe incomplete data setsarea problem.Criteria2has beensatisfiedbut thetestreportscite
limitations and exceptions when using NIDS for collecting evidence. Criteria 3 has again been
satisfiedbuttheerrorratesrequirescrutinyagainstandbenchmarkingagainstacceptableassurance
scales.Criteria4and5aresatisfied.NIDSevidencemaybeadmissibletoacourtoflawbutunder
cross examination many questions can be asked. An expert witness may be justified in presenting
such findings in the report based on the strength of the investigation methodology. However, the
gapsandexceptionsexistentintheprimaryevidencecollectionwillrequirecollaborativeevidences
from other sources to explain the NIDS contribution. A further and more challenging question is:
Whyiscriteria5satisfiedintheITsecuritycommunity?Fromtheliteraturerevieweditiseasytosee
that the strong case is that NIDS are effective and efficient for detection and reliant on for rapid
response defence. The weaker case made in the literature is for conditions on performance. To
simply explain the discrepancies as a cost benefit tradeoff overlooks the weighted problem of
reputation and credibility. A brand may financially accommodate many successful attacks through
spreading financial assurance but poor protective performance weakens customer appreciation.
Similarlysuccessfulcriminalswhoroamunchallengedwillcontinuetooffendandharmsystems.

CONCLUSION
OurfindingssuggestthatNIDSperformanceforgeneratingattackalertsvariesgreatlywithregardto
the number of packets passing through the network and also the complexity of attacks. The
variabilityinperformanceraisesseriousissuesregardingthevalueofevidencecollectedbyNIDS.A
simpleDDOSattackwhennotmuchishappeningonanetworkcanbereadilyalertedbutinnormal
busydayandwithacomplexattacktheNIDSisoflittleuse.Disturbinglytheresultsindicatethatan
engineer hoping to protect information assets and/or a computing asset requires more than fully
functionalNIDS.Similarly,evidencecollectedbyNIDSmayfallshortofadmissibilityorfacearaftof
challengesinacourtroomifoffendersaretobeprosecuted.Wetakeissuewiththeassumptionthat
NIDScanprovidetrustworthyevidence.Withoutconsiderationofthemanyvariablesimpactingthe
performanceofaNIDSunqualifiedstatementsoffactcannotbemade.Ourinvestigationshowsthat
NIDScannotactaloneinprotectingasystemandthatotherevidencewouldalsoberequiredbefore
admissibility.
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